Stuck Between a CAAF and a Hard Place: The Coram Nobis Petition of Private Ronald Gray and the Weakening of Military Justice by Cauley, William R.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 97 | Number 4 Article 6
5-1-2019
Stuck Between a CAAF and a Hard Place: The
Coram Nobis Petition of Private Ronald Gray and
the Weakening of Military Justice
William R. Cauley
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William R. Cauley, Stuck Between a CAAF and a Hard Place: The Coram Nobis Petition of Private Ronald Gray and the Weakening of
Military Justice, 97 N.C. L. Rev. 995 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol97/iss4/6
97 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2019) 
Stuck Between a CAAF and a Hard Place: The Coram Nobis 
Petition of Private Ronald Gray and the Weakening of Military 
Justice* 
INTRODUCTION 
Private Ronald Gray is the United States military’s longest 
resident of death row.1 Only three other prisoners sit there with him 
at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, where he has awaited execution since 1988.2 Private Gray’s 
case has been through numerous rounds of hearings, appeals, and 
petitions in both the military justice system and in the federal Article 
III courts. His most recent attempt at review has hit an interesting, 
and frustrating, roadblock. 
Private Gray’s story begins in December 1986, when a spree of 
rapes, robberies, and murders took place at Fort Bragg and the 
neighboring city of Fayetteville, North Carolina.3 The victims 
included Kimberly Ann Ruggles, a civilian cab driver who was raped 
and murdered, her cab abandoned in the woods near Fort Bragg; 
Private Laura Lee Vickery-Clay, who was abducted, raped, and 
murdered, her body also abandoned in the woods of Fort Bragg; and 
Private Mary Ann Lang Nameth, who was raped and stabbed in her 
barracks room but survived the attack.4 Private Gray was arrested, 
charged with the above crimes, and convicted on April 12, 1988, by a 
general court-martial on twelve counts or “specifications,” as they are 
called in the military justice system.5 He was sentenced to death.6 
 
 *  © 2019 William R. Cauley. 
 1. Description of Cases for Those Sentenced to Death in U.S. Military, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/description-cases-those-sentenced-death-
us-military [https://perma.cc/VX4E-4HAH]. 
 2. Id.; The U.S. Military Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/us-military-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/64ZS-JD34]. 
 3. United States v. Gray, 37 M.J. 730, 735–36 (A.C.M.R. 1992); see also Brief for the 
United States in Opposition at 2–4, Gray v. United States, 532 U.S. 919 (2001) (mem.) 
(No. 00-607), 2001 WL 34117598, at *2–4 [hereinafter Brief in Opposition]. 
 4. Gray, 37 M.J. at 735–36; Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 2–4. Gray also 
pleaded guilty to twenty-two other counts of, inter alia, murder, rape, and robbery in 
North Carolina Superior Court and was given eight life sentences. Brief in Opposition, 
supra note 3, at 2 n.1. 
 5. Gray, 37 M.J. at 733 (stating that Gray was convicted of two specifications of 
premeditated murder, one specification of attempted murder, three specifications of rape, 
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Private Gray filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the 
first military court of appeals, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals 
(“ACCA”).7 A writ of error coram nobis is a request for 
extraordinary relief that asserts a fundamental error by that court or a 
lower court in a previous judgment, order, or conviction.8 After 
ACCA denied the merits of Gray’s claims of error, he appealed to the 
highest military appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces (“CAAF”).9 It was here that Private Gray’s roadblock 
appeared. CAAF did not deny the merit of his claims but rather held 
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear such a petition in the first 
place.10 Furthermore, CAAF dismissed the petition with prejudice.11 
This holding was issued about a year after a federal district court 
similarly dismissed Gray’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus for 
want of jurisdiction.12 Thus, Private Gray was stuck: both CAAF and 
the district court ruled that he needed to exhaust his remedies in the 
other court before his cause could proceed in their court.13 
This outcome is a significant development in the history of the 
military justice system and of the military’s capital punishment 
process in particular. Over time, the system has grown more 
protective of defendants’ rights—such as by liberally granting juror 
disqualifications and conforming rules of evidence and procedure to 
those of civilian courts—thus enhancing the legitimacy of military 
courts as a tool of criminal justice in America. But a growing 
tendency on the part of these courts to refuse to exercise their full 
powers of review, as in their summary dismissal of Private Gray’s 
petition, now threatens that very legitimacy.  
This Recent Development proceeds in three parts. Part I 
describes the background of Private Gray’s case from his crime and 
conviction to his many appeals and reviews. Part II briefly tells the 
story of the last military defendant to be executed in 1961 and uses 
that as a starting point to discuss the evolving legitimacy of the 
 
two specifications of robbery, one specification of larceny, one specification of burglary, 
and two specifications of forcible sodomy). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Gray v. United States, 76 M.J. 579, 581 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017). 
 8. See infra Section III.A. 
 9. United States v. Gray, 77 M.J. 5, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2709 
(2018) (mem.). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Gray v. Belcher, No. 5:08-cv-03289-JTM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149574, at *4 
(D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2016). 
 13. See Gray, 77 M.J. at 6; Gray, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149574, at *2–4. 
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military’s capital process. Part III argues that military courts possess 
the authority to review a petition like Private Gray’s and that failure 
to do so not only leaves Private Gray out in the cold but also weakens 
the legitimacy and independence of the military justice system. 
I.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
While this Recent Development is concerned with Private 
Ronald Gray’s most recent appearance before CAAF, it is first 
necessary to trace some of the winding path through the military 
justice system that led him there. As noted above, Gray was convicted 
of twelve specifications by a general court-martial in 1988 and 
sentenced to death.14 After a series of motions, hearings, and 
interlocutory appeals on Gray’s mental capacity and the adequacy of 
his defense counsel, Gray’s first appeal on the merits of his case was 
heard by the Army Court of Military Review (“ACMR”), 
predecessor to ACCA, on April 8, 1992.15 The defense alleged 
twenty-seven errors in their petition, but the ACMR held that all the 
assignments of error were meritless, and the court affirmed the 
conviction and sentence.16 A supplemental hearing was then granted 
on twenty-nine additional assignments of error, but the ACMR again 
upheld the conviction and sentence.17 Additional delays interrupted 
Gray’s appeal to CAAF,18 but the military’s highest appellate court 
ultimately affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1999.19 
With his opportunities for relief on direct review exhausted, 
Private Gray awaited presidential approval of his sentence.20 First, the 
case went through clemency review, both at the Office of the Judge 
Advocate General and at the U.S. Department of Justice.21 President 
George W. Bush approved the sentence on July 28, 2008, and the 
Secretary of the Army scheduled his execution for December 10, 
 
 14. United States v. Gray, 37 M.J. 730, 733 (A.C.M.R. 1992). 
 15. Id. at 734–35. 
 16. Id. at 733–34. This part covers the general procedural history of Gray’s case. Some 
of the specific issues raised on appeal will be addressed in greater detail in Part II. 
 17. United States v. Gray, 37 M.J. 751, 754, 761 (A.C.M.R. 1993). 
 18. See United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1, 10 (C.A.A.F. 1999). Gray’s original appellate 
counsel was forced to withdraw by a transfer to new military duties. Id. In addition, the 
court heard supplemental arguments in the wake of a Supreme Court decision concerning 
military capital punishment in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). Gray, 51 M.J. 
at 10; see also Loving, 517 U.S. at 751, 774. 
 19. Gray, 51 M.J. at 64. 
 20. A military execution cannot be carried out without the approval of the President. 
See 10 U.S.C. §	857(a)(3) (Supp. 2017). 
 21. Gray v. Gray, No. 5:08-CV-3289-JTM, 2015 WL 5714260, at *17 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 
2015), rev’d, 645 F. App’x 624 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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2008.22 Gray filed a petition to stay the execution and for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of 
Kansas.23 The stay was granted pending further review.24 
Around 2015, the case entered truly complex procedural 
territory. The district court considered most of the claims in the 
habeas corpus petition to be without merit under a “full and fair 
consideration” standard.25 There were, however, other issues raised 
by the petition that were never considered by the military courts.26 
Ordinarily, these new objections would be considered waived, but 
Gray’s counsel, anticipating this procedural hurdle, concurrently filed 
a petition for extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of error coram 
nobis in the military courts.27 This presented the possibility that the 
new assignments of error would in fact be reviewed by a military 
court, thereby removing the procedural bar to the district court’s 
consideration of his habeas petition.28 As such, the district court 
created a “hybrid dismissal,” dismissing without prejudice those 
claims pending review in the military courts under the coram nobis 
petition and considering the remaining claims on the merits.29 The 
Tenth Circuit summarily reversed the hybrid dismissal and remanded 
with orders for the district court to adopt an alternative disposition, 
such as total dismissal of the petition.30 The district court chose to 
dismiss the entire petition without prejudice pending final disposition 
of Gray’s petition for coram nobis relief in the military courts.31 
Private Gray’s case then arrived at the point of interest to this 
Recent Development. Gray’s petition for coram nobis relief began in 
ACCA. ACCA determined that it had jurisdiction to consider six of 
Gray’s seven claims for relief but denied all of them.32 This holding 
would have seemed ordinary enough, but upon appeal to CAAF, the 
jurisdictional holding—and the whole case—was turned on its head. 
 
 22. Id. at *17–18. 
 23. Id. at *18. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *22 (“[W]hen a military decision has dealt ‘fully and fairly’ with an 
allegation .	.	. ‘it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate 
the evidence.’” (quoting Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143, 144 (10th Cir. 1986))). 
 26. Id. at *22–23.  
 27. Id. at *23. 
 28. See id. at *24. 
 29. See Gray v. Gray, 645 F. App’x 624, 625 (10th Cir. 2016); Gray, 2015 WL 5714260, 
at *37. 
 30. Gray, 645 F. App’x at 625–26. 
 31. Gray v. Belcher, No. 5:08-cv-03289-JTM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149574, at *1–4 
(D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2016). 
 32. See Gray v. United States, 76 M.J. 579, 594 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017). 
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CAAF held that the military courts altogether lacked the 
jurisdiction to hear the coram nobis petition.33 The court reasoned 
that the case had reached final judgment under Article 76 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and thus was beyond all 
review or alteration by the military courts.34 Furthermore, the court 
held that even if Article 76 were not an obstacle, the military courts 
could not extend extraordinary relief until Gray had exhausted his 
remedies in the Article III courts.35 After the Supreme Court’s recent 
denial of Gray’s petition for a writ of certiorari,36 Private Gray now 
finds himself in the strange position of having been denied review in 
both the military courts and the Article III federal courts on the basis 
of having not yet exhausted his remedies in the other system. 
II.  THE MILITARY CAPITAL PROCESS: EVOLUTION AND 
LEGITIMACY 
The military justice system is, at its core, unique, as its power 
comes not from Article III of the U.S. Constitution but from 
Article	I’s commitment to Congress of the power “[t]o make Rules 
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”37 
It also has unique goals. It is designed not only to “promote justice” 
but also “to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the 
armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military 
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the 
United States.”38 Despite its uniqueness, it has recently become the 
stated goal of some members of Congress to steadily align military 
justice more closely with the federal Article III courts.39 Differences 
remain—particularly the core principle of maintaining order and 
discipline—but the military justice system continues to be 
fundamentally legitimate because there has been a concerted effort 
 
 33. United States v. Gray, 77 M.J. 5, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2709 
(2018) (mem.). 
 34. Id.; see 10 U.S.C. §	876 (Supp. 2017). Article 76 codifies the common law principle 
of final judgments, which are meant to prevent repeated attacks on fully tried and 
reviewed cases. See §	876; see also United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 916 (2009). 
 35. Gray, 77 M.J. at 6 (citing Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911). 
 36. Gray v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2709 (2018) (mem.). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 14. 
 38. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt.	I, ¶	3 (2019) [hereinafter 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019)], https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/
99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610 
[https://perma.cc/4NB2-LJZT]. 
 39. See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. S6871 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2016) (statement of Sen. 
McCain) (“The legislation .	.	. incorporates best practices from Federal criminal practice 
and procedures.”). 
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throughout its history to scrutinize its practices and develop necessary 
procedural safeguards. 
The military last executed an American soldier, Private John A. 
Bennett, in 1961.40 His case serves as an interesting companion case to 
Private Gray’s and a starting point for examining the evolution of 
military capital punishment, both at trial and on appeal. This part 
briefly discusses the facts and history of Private Bennett’s case to 
show how the nascent UCMJ worked in practice. It then discusses the 
ways in which military justice, particularly military capital 
punishment, has changed and how, consequently, the system is a 
legitimate counterpart to civilian criminal justice. Finally, it will apply 
this historical analysis to some of the issues raised in Private Gray’s 
court-martial and show how his case was, in its initial stages, a display 
of proper military justice at work. 
A. A Comparison Case: Private John A. Bennett 
The most recent military execution was the hanging of Private 
John A. Bennett in 1961 for the December 1954 rape of Gertrude 
Aigner, an eleven-year-old Austrian girl.41 On February 8, 1955, after 
five days of trial, a general court-martial convicted Private Bennett of 
rape and attempted murder and sentenced him to death.42 Within 
eighteen months, the Court of Military Appeals (predecessor to 
CAAF) heard his final direct appeal and upheld his conviction.43 He 
filed a habeas petition, but it was denied in 1959.44 President Dwight 
Eisenhower approved Bennett’s sentence, and he was hanged at the 
United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 
April 13, 1961.45 
Without doubt, Private Bennett’s case raises eyebrows at first 
glance. First, he was executed less than seven years after his arrest.46 
By comparison, as of 2006, the average capital case took more than 
eight years just to get to a final direct appeal (excluding collateral 
 
 40. Richard A. Serrano, Pvt. John Bennett Is the Only U.S. Soldier Executed for Rape 
in Peacetime, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/10/
magazine/tm-18406 [https://perma.cc/6P23-DZL5]. 
 41. See United States v. Bennett, 21 C.M.R. 223, 225 (C.M.A. 1956). 
 42. Transcript of Record at 1, United States v. Bennett, 21 C.M.R. 223 (C.M.A. 1956) 
(No. 7709) [hereinafter Transcript of Record]; see also Stephen C. Reyes, Dusty Gallows: 
The Execution of Private Bennett and the Modern Capital Court-Martial, 62 NAVAL L. 
REV. 103, 104 (2013). 
 43. Bennett, 21 C.M.R. at 228. 
 44. Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15, 18 (10th Cir. 1959). 
 45. See Serrano, supra note 40. 
 46. See supra text accompanying notes 41–45. 
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proceedings).47 Second, Private Bennett is the only American soldier 
to be executed for rape during peacetime.48 Moreover, it is at least 
plausible that racial bias influenced Private Bennett’s case. Like ten 
of the eleven other soldiers who were executed during the time of his 
case,49 Private Bennett was black.50 Furthermore, of the six white 
soldiers awaiting execution during that same period, all six were given 
a reprieve—two by presidential commutation and four by judicial 
decisions.51 
Notwithstanding any potential racial bias, there are still a 
number of reasons that his conviction, sentence, or both would likely 
be overturned today. First, he was tried by a panel52 of nine 
members,53 whereas modern rules require twelve members in a capital 
case.54 Second, his defense counsel seemingly had no capital litigation 
experience, and his assistant defense counsel was not even a lawyer.55 
While the military has no strict learned-counsel requirement in capital 
cases56—though it is a feature of another facet of military justice: the 
military commissions used at Guantanamo Bay57—it would be 
unthinkable today to put on a capital defense with a nonlawyer in the 
second chair. Finally, Bennett received virtually no mitigation 
defense, aside from a few fellow soldiers testifying to his good 
military character.58 No thorough examination or challenge was made 
 
 47. See Dwight Sullivan, Killing Time: Two Decades of Military Capital Litigation, 189 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2006). 
 48. Serrano, supra note 40. This fact is more notable considering that only sixteen 
years later, the Supreme Court held that death sentences for rape not resulting in murder 
were unconstitutional. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977). 
 49. See Dwight Sullivan, A Matter of Life and Death: Examining the Military Death 
Penalty’s Fairness, FED. LAW., June 1998, at 38, 44 (discussing military executions between 
1954 and 1961). 
 50. Serrano, supra note 40. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Court-martial panels are roughly equivalent to juries in civilian courts. 
 53. Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 6. Eleven members were assigned to the 
panel, but one did not appear for duty, id. at 2, and another was peremptorily struck by 
the defense, id. at 10. 
 54. 10 U.S.C. §	825a (Supp. 2017). While there is an exception to this rule for 
“military exigencies,” id., Bennett was tried in peacetime Europe nearly ten years after the 
end of World War II, see supra text accompanying notes 41–42, so this exception likely 
would not bear on the case. 
 55. Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 5 (noting that assistant defense counsel 
Captain Thomas Guptill was “not certified in accordance [with Article] 27(b)” and that he 
was branched “AGC,” presumably the Adjutant General’s Corps). 
 56. See United States v. Hennis, 77 M.J. 7, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2017). In federal court, capital 
defendants must be afforded access to at least one counsel “learned in the law applicable 
to capital cases.” 18 U.S.C. §	3005 (2012). 
 57. 10 U.S.C. §	949a(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2012). 
 58. See Reyes, supra note 42, at 127. 
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on the basis of Bennett’s low IQ, family history of mental illness, or 
probable state of extraordinary intoxication and incapacity at the time 
of his crime.59 Since 2004, the military appellate courts have made 
clear that a death sentence cannot stand without a thorough 
mitigation defense that raises these issues if they are present.60 
B. The Evolution of Military Justice 
With Private Bennett’s case in mind, the next question of interest 
is how the system arrived at its current status. In the last half century, 
the Supreme Court has raised the constitutional floor for the use of 
capital punishment by any sentencing court, military or civilian. 
Alongside this development, the Supreme Court has also scrutinized 
the scope of military criminal jurisdiction, with an eye toward 
guaranteeing military defendants at least basic due process. Given 
these steady and major changes in the law, it is not surprising that 
there have been so few capital sentences or executions since Private 
Bennett’s. A close look at this evolution bolsters the claim that 
military justice has, through responsive adaptation, maintained its 
legitimacy. Furthermore, these changes provide a starting point for 
the analysis of the ultimate fairness of Private Ronald Gray’s own 
conviction and sentence—fairness undermined by CAAF’s summary 
treatment of his petitions. 
1.  Changes to Capital Punishment 
A decade or so after Private Bennett’s execution, capital 
punishment in America underwent a change. In 1972, Furman v. 
Georgia61 brought all executions to a halt.62 The rationale for this 
decision was split into five opinions,63 but ultimately all of the 
concurring judges agreed that capital punishment as practiced at the 
time was so arbitrary and capricious as to violate the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.64 Thirty-five states responded by amending 
their death penalty statutes in hopes the changes would pass 
constitutional muster.65 The Supreme Court subsequently dispensed 
with any notion that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se.66 In 
 
 59. See id. at 104, 132–34. 
 60. See United States v. Kreutzer, 59 M.J. 773, 783 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2004). 
 61. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 62. Id. at 239–40. 
 63. Id. at 240–374. 
 64. See, e.g., id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 65. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976). 
 66. See id. at 169. 
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1976, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia67 held that a system of capital 
punishment “circumscribed by legislative guidelines” was no longer 
constitutionally suspect.68 However, in 1977, Coker v. Georgia69 
narrowed the death penalty when the Supreme Court held that death 
was “disproportionate” to the crime of rape.70 And in 2008, Kennedy 
v. Louisiana71 confirmed the rule that the death penalty is similarly 
disproportionate for the rape of a child.72 
The military justice system followed the federal system’s lead in 
adopting greater procedural protections for capital defendants. In 
1983 in United States v. Matthews,73 the defendant was convicted of 
premeditated murder and rape, and the panel sentenced him to death 
following a secret ballot with no further report of their findings of 
fact.74 On appeal, the Court of Military Appeals held that this 
sentencing procedure was not adequate under the Supreme Court’s 
Furman and Gregg rulings.75 The court reversed the sentence and 
pronounced that military capital punishment would only be 
constitutional if Congress or the President promulgated new 
procedures to provide for specific findings of aggravating 
circumstances in capital sentences.76 In 1984, President Ronald 
Reagan issued an Executive Order promulgating these new 
procedures,77 which are now found in Rule for Courts-Martial 1004.78 
In most respects, military capital sentencing now bears a 
reasonable resemblance to its federal counterpart. Panels must have 
at least twelve members and must vote unanimously.79 In peacetime, 
the penalty is only available for murder under specified aggravating 
circumstances.80 Imposition of such a sentence triggers mandatory 
 
 67. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 68. Id. at 206–07. 
 69. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 70. Id. at 597–98 (stating that “the death penalty .	.	. is an excessive penalty for the 
rapist who, as such, does not take human life”). 
 71. 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 72. Id. at 413. 
 73. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983). 
 74. See id. at 359, 361. 
 75. See id. at 377–80 (holding that the failure to specify aggravating factors rendered 
the sentencing procedure inadequate). 
 76. See id. at 383, 392. 
 77. See Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3,169 (Jan. 26, 1984). 
 78. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019), supra note 38, 
pt.	II, r.	1004(c); Reyes, supra note 42, at 105. 
 79. 10 U.S.C. §	825a (Supp. 2017). 
 80. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019), supra note 38, 
pt.	II, r.	1004(c). 
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review in the military appellate court.81 In comparison, federal 
statutes also require Article III courts to consider aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in cases of capital sentencing.82 The jury 
must also consist of twelve members.83 While a death sentence does 
not trigger automatic review,84 it is mandated that such an appeal, if 
timely filed, be given priority over all others.85 
2.  Evolving Standards of Due Process and Fluctuating Military 
Jurisdiction 
Even before Furman’s changes to capital punishment, the 
Supreme Court briefly put a stop not merely to military death 
sentences but to all courts-martial that did not concern crimes of a 
strictly military nature.86 In O’Callahan v. Parker,87 the defendant had 
been convicted of an assault and attempted rape while off base and 
off duty.88 The Court held the Constitution’s mandate that Congress 
“[govern] .	.	. the land and naval Forces” was limited to crimes related 
to military service—“the flouting of military authority, the security of 
a military post, or the integrity of military property.”89 Justice 
Douglas, writing for the Court, put great emphasis on the 
insufficiency of the military courts in protecting the constitutional 
rights of citizen-soldiers.90 Under this new construction, if a soldier 
misbehaved off post—or on post in a manner not connected to his 
duties—the case would have to go before civilian authorities.91 
The Court would not recognize a full restoration of court-martial 
jurisdiction over all crimes committed by servicemembers until 1987, 
when it upheld a coast guardsman’s court-martial conviction for 
sexual assault of a minor while off duty.92 In reinstating court-martial 
 
 81. 10 U.S.C. §	867(a)(1) (2012). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. §§	3592, 3593(d) (2012). 
 83. Id. §	3593(b). 
 84. See id. §	3595(a) (requiring review by the court of appeals only if the defendant 
timely appeals). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). “[E]xpansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain 
carries with it a threat to liberty.” Id. at 265. 
 87. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). 
 88. Id. at 259–60. 
 89. See id. at 273–74 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 14). 
 90. See id. at 262 (“Those civil rights are the constitutional stakes in the present 
litigation.”); id. at 265 (“A court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice 
.	.	.	.”). 
 91. See id. at 262, 268–69, 273–74. 
 92. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450–51 (1987). 
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jurisdiction, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that for a century 
before O’Callahan, the Court had interpreted the plain language of 
Article I to extend court-martial jurisdiction to all crimes determined 
appropriate by Congress.93 Furthermore, O’Callahan had served only 
to create confusion, as courts were forced to determine what terms 
such as “service-connected” really meant.94 Military law can extend to 
virtually all activity conducted by soldiers because the UCMJ 
assimilates most federal and state crimes (of the state in which the act 
occurred) into the so-called General Article, regardless of their 
relationship to military duties.95 
A revival of respect for the fairness of the military justice system 
since the nadir of O’Callahan was more than a mere caprice of 
changing justices on the Supreme Court. The system itself has 
changed to establish its legitimacy through guarantees of due process 
and fairness. Even prior to O’Callahan, the very establishment of the 
UCMJ in 1950 stands as a marker of the commitment to a process 
that is as fair as it is orderly.96 Congress and the President have 
continued to make improvements to the guarantees of due process 
over the years, including the institutionalization of military judges in 
196897 and the creation of the Military Rules of Evidence in 1980.98  
 
 93. Id. at 439. 
 94. See id. at 448–49. 
 95. See 10 U.S.C. §	934 (Supp. 2017) (making criminal “all disorders and neglects to 
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to 
bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which 
persons subject to this chapter may be guilty”). The “Punitive Articles” part of the Manual 
for Courts-Martial provides a nonexhaustive list of specific offenses that can be tried under 
the General Article. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019), supra 
note 38, pt.	IV. Assimilation of state crimes into “areas within federal jurisdiction,” 
including military installations and courts-martial, is effected by what is known as the 
Federal Assimilative Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. §	13 (2012). 
 96. See U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., CRIMINAL LAW 
DESKBOOK: PRACTICING MILITARY JUSTICE 1–2 (2018). The citizen-army of WWII 
chafed under the swiftness of military justice. After over a century of using the Articles of 
War, Congress adopted a unified military justice system that would more closely resemble 
civilian criminal justice. Id. 
 97. Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). Previously, courts-martial only required a 
“law officer” to advise the panel on the law. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 
UNITED STATES ¶	39 (1951) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 
STATES (1951)], http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-1951.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y69V-CXF5].The law officer was an attorney, but one whose regular duties were not that 
of a judge. Id. 
 98. H.F. Gierke, The Thirty-Fifth Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture on Criminal Law, 193 
MIL. L. REV. 178, 190 (2007). 
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C. What Does This Mean for Private Ronald Gray? 
Given the twists and turns of this history, it is not surprising that 
the military did not perform an execution for at least the first few 
decades since Private Bennett was put to death. Still, there remains 
the question of the lengthy delay since Private Ronald Gray’s 
conviction and sentencing. Interestingly enough, the delay is mostly 
attributable to the modern military system’s ultimate fairness, and 
that same fairness is probably the reason why Private Gray’s sentence 
will remain in place. 
Some substantial differences still remain between the military 
capital process and that of the civilian system. As mentioned above, 
there is no requirement for learned capital defense counsel for 
military cases.99 Another difference of note is a feature of the military 
justice system as a whole: the convening authority selects the jury 
pool (or panel)—that is, the same person who charges the defendant 
and approves their sentence.100 On the other hand, some differences 
in the military system actually offer the defendant arguably more 
protection than they would receive in a civilian court. In courts-
martial, all trials, capital or otherwise, have bifurcated findings and 
sentencing phases, so even a relatively inexperienced defense counsel 
would be familiar with the process of offering mitigation defenses.101 
Military voir dire includes a “liberal grant mandate” of for-cause 
strikes requested by defense counsel.102 Lastly, during military 
appeals, the courts have the power to exercise de novo review of even 
the findings of fact.103 
Consequently, it is unlikely Private Gray’s cause will advance 
very far. The federal courts usually grant great deference to the rules 
and procedures of the military courts.104 This standard of review has 
remained largely constant since Private John Bennett’s trial and 
execution.105 Given the deferential standard of review, it would take a 
 
 99. Compare United States v. Hennis, 77 M.J. 7, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2017), with 18 U.S.C. 
§	3005 (2012) (requiring learned defense counsel in all federal capital prosecutions). 
 100. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019), supra note 38, 
pt.	II, r.	503(a). 
 101. See id. pt.	II, r.	1001(a). 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274, 276–77 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 
 103. See United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 378 (C.M.A. 1983). 
 104. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976) (holding that findings of due 
process violations are only appropriate if the need for other or additional process is “so 
extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress”). 
 105. See Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15, 17 (10th Cir. 1959) (“We inquire only to 
determine whether competent military tribunals gave fair and full consideration to all of 
the procedural safeguards deemed essential to a fair trial under military law.”); Gray v. 
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very substantial showing by any petitioner to convince the Article III 
courts that their case warranted reversal. That showing becomes even 
more difficult to assert given the many procedural safeguards and 
advantages afforded military defendants. Many of the safeguards 
described above have been in place since the UCMJ was promulgated 
in 1950,106 and those that were not had been put into place in time for 
Ronald Gray’s court-martial. Indeed, Gray’s direct appeals took more 
than a decade to complete because the appellate courts granted 
motion after motion to examine his competency; file supplemental 
assignments of error; and replace, withdraw, and replace again his 
defense counsel.107 CAAF considered no fewer than seventy asserted 
issues and errors in its review and found none warranted reversal.108 
Another eight years passed after this review because no execution 
may be carried out without the personal authorization of the 
President.109 
This is not to say that Private Gray’s original case did not raise 
interesting questions. His appeal presented a chance for CAAF to 
consider a host of issues, many unique to military justice, such as 
whether the practice of panel members asking questions of witnesses 
during trial infringed upon the right to an impartial jury.110 Another 
example was whether the post-trial discovery of Private Gray’s brain 
damage required a new trial be ordered.111 The courts answered both 
of these questions in the negative,112 but the more important question 
answered was the adequacy of the appellate review given to Private 
Gray’s case. The issues were thoroughly and exhaustively considered, 
 
Gray, No. 5:08-CV-3289-JTM, 2015 WL 5714260, at *22 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2015) 
(repeating the Supreme Court’s admonition that “when a military decision has dealt ‘fully 
and fairly’ with an allegation .	.	. ‘it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ 
simply to re-evaluate the evidence’” (quoting Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143, 144 (10th 
Cir. 1986))), rev’d, 645 F. App’x 624 (10th Cir. 2016). Even the brief foray into limits on 
military jurisdiction imposed by O’Callahan recognized this deference to military process 
so long as proper military jurisdiction was found. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 
272 (1969). 
 106. See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1951), supra 
note 97. In addition, one of the more glaring inconsistencies with ordinary judicial 
procedure noted in Bennett’s case, representation of the defendant in part by a nonlawyer, 
had been rectified by the time of the promulgation of the 1968 Manual for Courts-Martial. 
See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES ch.	III, ¶	6d. (1968), 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-1968.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PJY-DGEY]. 
 107. See United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1, 9–10 (C.A.A.F. 1999). 
 108. See id. at 6–8, 64. 
 109. 10 U.S.C. §	857(a)(3) (Supp. 2017). 
 110. See Gray, 51 M.J. at 50. 
 111. See id. at 12–14. 
 112. See id. at 14, 50. 
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and military justice was shown to be something more than a “rough 
form of justice.”113 It may be cold comfort to capital defendants, but it 
is precisely this exhaustive treatment coupled with the 
aforementioned procedures and safeguards that undergird the 
legitimacy of the military justice system. But, as will be discussed in 
the next part, CAAF’s treatment of Private Gray’s latest petition for 
relief threatens this legitimacy. 
III.  THE MILITARY COURTS MUST ASSERT THEIR AUTHORITY TO 
PRESERVE THE LEGITIMACY OF THEIR SYSTEM 
CAAF’s determination that it lacked the jurisdiction to issue a 
writ of error coram nobis is part of a broader trend in the military 
courts over the past several years to decline to issue extraordinary 
writs and to, more importantly, narrow the scope of their own 
authority.114 This is an unfortunate trend for two reasons. First, it 
threatens to subordinate the military courts to their Article III 
counterparts such that it calls into question the military courts’ 
usefulness. Second, in the meantime, it leaves defendants and 
petitioners like Private Gray stuck between an Article III system that 
defers to the military courts and military courts that are unwilling to 
exercise their own power. Professor Stephen I. Vladeck’s essay 
Military Courts and the All Writs Act discusses these developments in 
great detail,115 but further examination is required when the stakes are 
raised to life or death. This part will first outline the scope of the 
military courts’ authority as it relates to collateral review and 
extraordinary relief, with particular reference to the All Writs Act.116 
It will then show how the military courts’ failure to properly utilize 
this power has negatively impacted both Private Gray’s petition and, 
more broadly, the foundations of the military justice system. 
A. The Scope of the Authority of Military Courts 
The powers of the military courts flow directly from Congress’s 
constitutional mandate to make “[r]ules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”117 The standing military 
appellate courts are specifically endowed with vast powers of review, 
 
 113. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957). 
 114. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and the All Writs Act, 17 GREEN 
BAG 2D 191 (2014) (examining military courts’ refusal to exercise the extent of their 
powers). 
 115. See id. at 191–205. 
 116. 28 U.S.C. §	1651 (2012). 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	8, cl. 14. 
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including the power to review findings of fact.118 Important for the 
purposes of this Recent Development, the military courts as “courts 
established by Act of Congress” are endowed with the power of the 
All Writs Act.119 This power covers both writs “in aid of [the court’s] 
jurisdiction”120 and interlocutory writs and judgments.121 The powers 
of the All Writs Act enable jurisdiction, but they may not be used to 
enlarge a court’s jurisdiction.122 The Supreme Court has explicitly 
recognized this power in Noyd v. Bond123 with regard to any case a 
military court may review.124 
Writs of error coram nobis are “ancient writ[s] .	.	. available at 
common law to correct errors of fact.”125 Roughly translated, coram 
nobis means “before us,” meaning it may be used to challenge the 
validity of judgments or orders in the court that issued the judgment 
or order.126 It is an extraordinary remedy meant to correct “errors of 
the most fundamental character.”127 It is not a true collateral attack, 
although it bears some resemblance in that it is distinct from ordinary 
direct appeals.128 Rather, coram nobis is another form of appeal 
within the same criminal case.129 Procedural finality of a judgment is 
not a bar to consideration of coram nobis relief.130 
The military courts began to waver on the use of the All Writs 
power following Clinton v. Goldsmith.131 In that case, an Air Force 
officer was administratively—that is, not as a result of a court-martial 
proceeding—removed from the service, and he petitioned the military 
 
 118. See 10 U.S.C.A. §	866(d)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-5 & 116-8). 
 119. 28 U.S.C. §	1651(a) (2012). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. §	1651(b) (granting the power of “writ or rule nisi,” meaning an intermediate 
or interlocutory ruling). 
 122. See Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41–43 (1985). 
Specifically, the Court quoted a Supreme Court opinion in which Chief Justice Stone 
wrote that “[t]he writs may not be used as a substitute for an authorized appeal.” Id. at 41 
(quoting U.S. Alkali Exp. Ass’n. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 203 (1945)). 
 123. 395 U.S. 683 (1969). 
 124. See id. at 695 n.7. 
 125. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1954). 
 126. See id. at 507 n.9. 
 127. Id. at 512 (quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914)). 
 128. See United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 913 (2009); Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 
n.4. 
 129. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 913; Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 n.4. 
 130. Denedo, 556 U.S. at 915–16. 
 131. 526 U.S. 529 (1999); cf. Vladeck, supra note 114, at 194–203 (using Goldsmith as a 
starting point in tracing a path to other cases in which military courts have declined, 
wrongly in Professor Vladeck’s view, to use extraordinary writs). 
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appellate courts for extraordinary relief by an injunction.132 CAAF 
issued the injunction against the President as Commander-in-Chief, 
relying on the All Writs Act as authority.133 The Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed, holding that CAAF’s jurisdiction only 
extended reviewing matters tried and disposed of by courts-martial.134 
CAAF’s enjoining of the President on a related, but nonetheless 
separate, administrative decision was an expansion of the court’s 
jurisdiction, a direct contravention of All Writs Act jurisprudence.135 
This rebuke of the use of extraordinary writs was not an 
extraordinary action; rather it was in conformity with longstanding 
doctrine across the federal courts, not just the military courts.136 It was 
not a substantive narrowing of the military courts’ power but rather a 
restraining of that power to what it was all along. 
If there was any doubt about the scope of military courts’ 
authority under the All Writs Act, the Supreme Court provided some 
clarity in United States v. Denedo.137 There, the Court considered the 
cause of a sailor discharged under a court-martial conviction and 
facing subsequent deportation in immigration proceedings.138 The 
sailor, Denedo, petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming 
his court-martial conviction was invalid.139 If true, the writ of error 
might stay his deportation.140 CAAF had held that coram nobis 
review was appropriate, but remanded the case to the lower court for 
further proceedings.141 A dissenting CAAF judge argued that this was 
incorrect under Goldsmith because the case had reached final 
judgment, removing it from CAAF’s jurisdiction.142 Justice Kennedy, 
 
 132. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 531. It is notable, though, that Major Goldsmith was in fact 
convicted by a court-martial for the same conduct underlying his administrative 
separation. Id. at 531–32. However, this simply was not the basis of his petition to the Air 
Force Court of Criminal Appeals and appeal to CAAF. 
 133. Id. at 532. 
 134. See id. at 531. 
 135. See id. at 537; see also Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41–
43 (1985) (stating that the All Writs Act is not meant to expand jurisdictions or provide 
alternatives to available statutory remedies). 
 136. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32–34 (2002); Pa. Bureau of 
Corr., 474 U.S. at 41–43. 
 137. 556 U.S. 904 (2009). 
 138. Id. at 907. 
 139. Id. at 907–08. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 908. 
 142. See Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (Ryan, J., 
dissenting), aff’d, 556 U.S. 904 (2009). 
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writing for the Court, held that the rule of Noyd v. Bond143 still 
controlled: the military courts do have the power of extraordinary 
relief under the All Writs Act.144 Furthermore, the Court held that 
any determination of “finality” was immaterial, as it is in the very 
nature of a coram nobis petition to reconsider what had been a final 
judgment.145 
B. CAAF’s Dismissal of Private Gray’s Claim Is a Failure to 
Exercise Proper Authority 
Despite the Court’s clear statements that CAAF has jurisdiction 
to issue extraordinary writs, CAAF nevertheless found that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Private Gray’s petition.146 This finding was in error 
for several reasons. First, CAAF relied on the finality of the judgment 
under Article 76 of the UCMJ in determining that it could not 
entertain a coram nobis petition,147 but this is a direct contradiction of 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis from Denedo.148 In addition, CAAF stated 
that coram nobis relief is entirely unavailable if other remedies 
exist.149 This is based on dicta in Denedo commenting that coram 
nobis relief is limited in such a way as to protect the finality of 
judgments in most cases.150 But, tracing the origins of this statement 
from United States v. Morgan,151 the Denedo Court read its own 
precedent a little too broadly.152 The cited segment of Morgan does 
indeed discuss the alternative remedy of habeas corpus.153 However, 
Morgan did not find that access to habeas corpus is a limit on 
extraordinary writs, but quite the opposite: the federal habeas statute 
 
 143. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 n.7 (1969) (“[T]here can[not] be any doubt as to 
the power of the Court of Military Appeals [under the All Writs Act] to issue an 
emergency writ.”). 
 144. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911. 
 145. See id. at 915–16 (“Article 76 codifies the common-law rule that respects the 
finality of judgments. Just as the rules of finality did not jurisdictionally bar the court in 
Morgan from examining its earlier judgment, neither does the principle of finality bar the 
[military court] from doing so here.” (citation omitted)). 
 146. See United States v. Gray, 77 M.J. 5, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Denedo, 556 U.S. at 915–16. 
 149. Gray, 77 M.J. at 6. 
 150. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911 (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 
(1954)). 
 151. 346 U.S. 502 (1954). 
 152. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911 (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511). 
 153. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510–11. 
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should not be read as a bar to other writs and remedies.154 Moreover, 
CAAF seems to ignore the fact that Private Gray’s case is before 
them in part because the federal courts have barred his habeas 
petitions until such time as the military courts render a decision on 
the issues raised by the coram nobis petition.155 
It is admittedly likely that even if CAAF had granted review, 
Private Gray’s petition would have failed on the merits. ACCA had 
already reviewed the petition on the merits and denied all of his 
claims.156 This is not the point, though. CAAF’s failure lies not so 
much in miscarrying justice with respect to Ronald Gray but rather in 
its refusal to fully exercise its power of review. The military courts 
narrowed their own jurisdiction by standing so stubbornly on the 
“finality” ordered by Article 76, refusing to exercise their authority to 
review final decisions despite the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
such power. Doing so weakens the legitimacy of military justice as an 
independent judicial system because it treats the collateral review 
power of the Article III courts as superior and preferable to the 
military courts’ power to review their own judgments.157 
It is also a disservice to Private Gray. Even though ACCA’s 
denial of his claims portends denials by other reviewing courts, he at 
least enjoyed a full consideration of his rights before it was 
determined that none had been violated in this instance. He now sits 
both unvindicated and unheard. This can only lead to one of two 
judicial outcomes: either intervention from the Article III courts or 
inaction from the whole of the judiciary. In either event, the military 
courts are left worse off, either as “subservient .	.	. to their Article III 
civilian counterparts”158 or as a place where soldiers only find that 
proverbial “rough form of justice.”159 Neither outcome is a welcome 
one. 
CONCLUSION 
This much is clear: the military courts have the power to review 
petitions for extraordinary relief just like any other court created by 
 
 154. See id. at 511 (“Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to 
impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.” (quoting 
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952))). 
 155. See Gray v. Belcher, No. 5:08-CV-03289-JTM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149574, at 
*3 (D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2016). 
 156. See Gray v. United States, 76 M.J. 579, 594 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017). 
 157. See Vladeck, supra note 114, at 204–05. 
 158. Id. at 200. 
 159. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957). 
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Congress. The exercise of this power is acutely important when life 
and death are at stake, even if the end result is to deny such relief. 
Even a denial of relief after a full and fair consideration better 
respects the rights of defendants than simply refusing to consider the 
claim. CAAF failed in this regard when it claimed a lack of 
jurisdiction to grant Private Ronald Gray’s coram nobis petition. 
The precise facts of Private Gray’s situation are relatively rare. 
Only a few servicemen sit on death row, and few are likely to join 
them. However, while Gray’s case is perhaps the most perplexing, it is 
not the only example of military courts weakening their own 
authority. The military courts have declined to use the All Writs 
power to enforce certain First Amendment protections in the 
Guantanamo military commissions and in the Chelsea Manning 
case.160 
The precedents of the Supreme Court make clear that CAAF 
does possess such jurisdiction. CAAF’s failure to exercise its 
authority either leaves Private Gray without a venue to be heard or 
invites intrusion into the independence of the military courts. Without 
that independence, the need for such courts is called into question. 
This is a disservice to a system that has willingly adapted over time to 
afford soldiers a substantial degree of due process. It also undermines 
a system established to serve the cause of the “good order and 
discipline [of] the armed forces,” which “thereby .	.	. strengthen[s] the 
national security of the United States.”161 CAAF must, therefore, do 
better for us all. 
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